The Right to a Jury Trial in FELA Actions in State Courts by Chambers, Jack H.
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
IN FELA ACTIONS IN STATE COURTS
JACK H. CHAMBERS*
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Brown v. Western
Ry. of Ala.1 said of the use of the terms "substantive" and
"procedural" in determining whether state or federal law
applied:
"They derive content from the functions they serve
here [in FELA actions in state courts] in precisely
the same way in which we have applied them in
reverse situations [federal trials of diversity cases
involving non-federal rights under Erie -v. Tomp-
kins] ."
The accuracy of this statement, that the substantive-pro-
cedural dividing line is the same for cases of trial of Federal
Employers' Liability Act rights in state courts as in federal
court trials of non-federal rights in diversity cases, 2 with
particular regard to the right to a jury, is the subject of
inquiry here. As a further development of this subject we
must also consider the extent to which state rules may
affect the right to jury in federal courts, and, conversely,
what control the federal government may exercise over
states' uses of the jury.
As a starting point, it may be well to note that in both
federal diversity cases and Liability Act trials in state
courts, the courts have generally accepted substantive and
procedural tests as an adequate generalization of the rule
to be applied when deciding whether state or federal law
is to be applied to a given subject. Both the opinion of the
court and the dissent speak of this division in Erie V. Tomp-
kins. And the great majority of courts have readily ac-
* 2d year law student, Duke University; A.B. Duke, 1951.
1 338 U.S. 294, 301 (1949).
"Diversity cases" is used here as a convenient term representing all
types of cases in which the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins requires that
state law be applied in the federal courts. That this doctrine applies to
cases other than diversity, see Snepp, The Law Applied in the Federal
Courts, 13 LAw & Coxwr. PROB. 165, 168 (1948).
3 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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cepted this division as representing the dividing line in
diversity cases.4 In FELA cases being tried in state courts
this same distinction has been frequently discussed by the
courts in their decisions as to whether state or federal rules
prevail.5
Not only have the same labels been applied in the two
types of situations, but also the rulings on whether a par-
ticular matter is procedural or substantive have been the
same generally whether the question arose out of a diversity
action or a state trial of FELA rights. Thus, the question
of who bears the burden of proof has been held to be sub-
stantive, both in diversity cases,6 and in actions under the
Liability Act.7 Admissability of evidence is a procedural
question to be decided by the law of the forum in both types
of cases." And in both Federal Employers' Liability actions
and diversity cases the question of what constitutes negli-
gence has been ruled to be a substantive one.9
Though the procedural-substantive line of division may
be valid in determining what law applies for many
'questions, is that line of division valid in determining the
controlling law on the right to a jury and the division of
functions between judge and jury?
Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.10 involved an accident
case brought to the federal courts on diversity. There, be-
fore the case was removed to the United States District
Court, the Kansas City Court of Appeals had twice decided
that the evidence in the case was sufficient to go to the
' See cases collected in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652.
s See cases collected in 45 U.S.C.A. § 51, In particular notes 502-504.
New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367 (1918).
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Service 0il v. Dunlap,
308 U.S. 208 (1939).
8 In diversity cases see Waider v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 10 F.R.D.
376 (S. D. Iowa 1950); Franzen v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours, 51 F.Supp.
578 (D. N.J. 1943). In FELA actions In state courts, Central Vermont
Ry. Co., v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915); Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645
(1946). cf Fed. Rule 43(a).
9 In diversity cases, Southern Pacific Co. v. Haight, 126 F.2d 900
(9th Cir. 1942); Young v. Julian, 97 1'. Supp. (D. Del. 1951). In IEDLA
actions, Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
10 311 U.S. 464 (1940).
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jury,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the fed-
eral District Court had erred in granting a directed verdict
in a trial of the same issue on the same evidence which had
been before the state court. Though the Court does not
discuss the substantive-procedural division, the decision ap-
pears to be authority for the view that the sufficiency of
evidence in diversity cases is a substantive question to be
decided in accordance with state law. However, the pecu-
liar fact situation may explain the case, and possibly it
"should be regarded as a novel application of the doctrine
of the 'law of the case.' "312
Although the Stoner case may not have established beyond
question that the rule as to sufficiency of evidence in diver-
sity cases is a substantive one, the question has been set-
tled as substantive in FELA cases in state courts by Brady
v. Southern Ry. Co.'1  There the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the North Carolina Supreme Court had
erred in applying the state standard of the sufficiency of
evidence instead of the federal standard in a state trial of
a FELA right.
This ruling that sufficiency of evidence is a substantive
questions covers only a part of the general field of division
of functions between judge and jury, and can hardly be
said to stand for the general proposition that the entire
field of division between judge and jury is a matter of sub-
U The first action, 90 S.W.2d 784 (Kan. City Ct. Ap. 1936). The sec-
ond action, 232 Mo.App. 1048, 114 S.W.2d 167 (1938).
In April, 1934, Stoner brought suit in a Missouri state court to re-
cover disability payments due from the New York Life Ins. Co. The
trial judge rendered a directed verdict for the defendant. On appeal
the Kansas City Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiff had presented
sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury. In 1936, while this case
was still pending, plaintiff brought suit for other disability benefits
which had accrued since commencement of the first action. This time
the plaintiff was successful in the lower court and the defendant ap-
pealed. The result was again reversed (because of incorrect instruc-
tions to the jury), but the Kansas City Court of Appeals again ruled
that plaintiff's evidence had established a jury question. While both
these actions were pending the Insurance Co. brought this suit in the
federal district court for a declaratory judgment ruling that the Com-
pany was no longer required to make disability payments to Stoner.
12 Moonu, FEDER PRAcTIcE, p. 29 (1st ed., vol. 3, 1950 supp.).
" 320 U.S. 476 (1943).
DUKE BAR JOURNAL
stantive law. In Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.
Co.14 the court has gone far toward settling that proposi-
tion. The case involved an action brought in the Ohio courts
under the FELA. The trial judge himself decided the issue
of fraud in obtaining a release, instead of submitting that
issue to the jury. This is in accordance with the Ohio prac-
tice, but not with the federal rule.1 The result was
upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court,1" but reversed by the
United States Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision.
Reversal was based in part on the error of the Ohio Court
in applying the state rather than the federal standard as
to the validity of releases (and in this the minority con-
curred). But the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Black
went further and held that there was also error in with-
holding the issue of fraud from the jury. The language of
the opinion indicates with certainty that the right to a jury
trial is a substantive right:
"[T]he right to trial by jury is too substantial a
part of the rights accorded by the [FEL] Act to
permit it to be classified as a 'mere local rule of pro-
cedure' for denial in the manner that Ohio has
here used."'1
The minority opinion regards the majority as holding
the right to a jury trial a substantive one, at least under the
Employers' Liability Act:
"The fact that Congress authorized actions under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act to be brought
in State as well as in Federal courts seems a
strange basis for the inference that Congress over-
rode State procedural arrangements controlling all
other negligence suits in a State, by imposing upon
State courts to which plaintiffs choose to go the
rules prevailing in the Federal courts regarding
juries."18
342 U.S. 359 (1952).
25 For the Federal rule, see note 14, supra, at p. 362. For the Ohio rule,
see Dice v. Akron, Cf. d- Y. R. Co. 155 Ohio St. 185, 98 N.E. 2d 301, (1951),
"0 Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 155 Ohio St. 185, 98 N.E.2d 301, (1951).
:17 Supra, note 14 at 363.
18 Ibid. at 368.
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Before discussing at any length the effect of the Dice case,
one more case must be considered. Herron v. Southern
Pacific Co.19 was an action brought on the basis of diversity
in a Federal District Court as a result of an automobile-
train accident in Arizona. The Arizona Constitution pro-
vided that in all cases involving contributory negligence
that issue was to be submitted to the jury.20 Yet, the dis-
trict judge decided the question of contributory negligence
without sending it to the jury, and this action was affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court. Since this case arose
in 1931, it might have been argued that the right to a jury
trial on the issue of contributory negligence was a mere
procedural right and, therefore, the Conformity Act 2' re-
quired that the issue be submitted to the jury. But no such
contention was made. Counsel for the appellant chose to
argue that the right to a jury was a matter of substance and,
under the Rules of Decision Act,22 the state constitutional
provision was controlling. The opinion of the Court by
Chief Justice Hughes shows that the appellant was wise in
not arguing that the question was procedural, and agrees
that the matter involved is substantive:
"The rule of the Arizona Constitution cannot be
regarded as one that relates merely to practice or
to a 'form' or 'mode of proceeding.' The provision
'cuts deep into the right, observed at common law,
by which defendant can obtain a decision by the
court, upon a proven state of facts.' ",23
However, the Court felt the state rule could not be ap-
plied in the federal courts on this question because the
federal courts are bound by the Seventh Amendment to
apply their own separation of functions between judge and
jury:
"In a trial by jury in a federal court, the judge is
not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the
trial for the purpose of assuming its proper con-
283 U.S. 91 (1931).
'AIZ. CONST., Art. 18, § 5.
28 U.S.C. § 724.
28 U.S.C. § 725.
,Supra, note 19 at 93.
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duct and of determining questions of law. This
discharge of the judicial function as at common
law is an essential factor in the process for which
the Federal Constitution provides.12 4
The cases discussed, when considered as a group, indicate
that the line between substance and procedure is the same
in this' field for both diversity and FELA cases. The divi-
sion of functions between judge and jury is, by these cases,
a matter of substantive law. But, as the Herron case shows,
division of functions in federal courts is controlled by the
Seventh Amendment, and may not be changed by state law
even though the substantive-procedural division would call
for a division of functions in accordance with state law. If
this conclusion is correct, the result in the Stoner case would
appear unsound. Even if that decision is 'law of the case,'
the result therein, according to the Herron case, should have
been governed by the Seventh Amendment. There are two
possible explanations for the Stoner decision. First, the
Seventh Amendment was apparently not argued by coun-
sel and, possibly, was never considered by the Court a a
part of the case. The second possible, if tenuous, explana-
tion is that the Court drew a distinction between cases
where, as in Herron, the state completely eliminates the
dividing line between functions of judge and jury by pro-
viding that a certain question shall lie solely in the province
of only one of the two; and cases where, as in Stoner, a state
still provides a dividing line between judge and jury ques-
tions on certain functions, but determines that line accord-
ing to state, rather than federal, practice. The former of
the two explanations seems more plausible, but only by the
rationale of the second possibility may the decisions in both
Herron and Stoner be accepted as valid. In view of the
fact that neither argument of counsel nor the opinion of
the court in the Stoner case mentions the Seventh Amend-
ment, it seems better to concede that the Amendment was
overlooked in the case and the decision, therefore, rested
on false grounds.
Since the Seventh Amendment seems to prevent state
2, IbMd. at 95.
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control of the federal use of juries, the question naturally
suggested is whether there is anything which forbids the
federal government to force rules concerning use of the
jury on the states. There are no federal constitutional re-
quirements or limitations on state juries in civil actions. In
the words of Mr. Justice Holmes:
"There is nothing in the Constitution of the United
States or its Amendments that requires a State to
maintain the line with which we are familiar be-
tween the functions of the jury and those of the
Court. It may do away with the jury altogether.125
There being no Constitutional requirement of state use
of the jury in civil actions, we may better understand any
possible limitations on federal control by first examining
the extent of the federal requirement that state courts take
jurisdiction of cases arising under the Employers' Liability
Act. The Act, itself generally justifiable under the Com-
merce Clause, provides that state courts shall have con-
current jurisdiction with the federal courts of cases aris-
ing under the Act.26 In Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co.2 7 the Supreme Court decided affirmatively the question:
"[W] hether rights arising under the congressional
act may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of
the states when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by
local laws, is adequate to the occasion."28
-' Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 56 (1919).
-' 45 U.S.C.A. § 56.
" 223 U.S. 1, 55 (1912).
It must be made explicit that the Court did not consider the ques-
tion whether Congress might validly force any new type of jurisdiction,
or a different mode of procedure, on the state courts: "[T]here is not
here involved any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the juris-
diction of state courts or to control or affect their modes of procedure,
but only a question of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary juris-
diction is prescribed by local laws is appropriate . .. to take cogniz-
ance of an action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under the
act of Congress . . ." The decision, then, is limited to a construction
of the FELA, and does not involve the constitutional question regard-
ing the right of the federal government to control and regulate state
courts. Similarly, it is not the purpose of this article to consider the
possible restrictions placed on the federal government in this field by
the Tenth Amendment.
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However, the Act does not require state courts to take
jurisdiction of FELA cases if those courts would not, under
the law of the state, have jurisdiction over similar cases
involving non-federal rights.29 The requirement is simply
that a state may not refuse to take jurisdiction of a case
because the suit is brought under federal law. 0
In Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis 1 the court
decided that the right to a Seventh Amendment jury is not
a right which necessarily attaches to federally created
rights.3 2  The question involved was whether Minnesota
could validly provide for jury decisions by only five-sixths
of the jury in actions arising under the FELA. The ap-
proval given the Minnesota system has generally been
accepted to stand for the proposition that states do not
have to provide a jury system for FELA actions different
from the system used by the state for local negligence
cases. 5 The net effect of the doctrines of Mondou, supra,
and Bombolis is to establish the doctrine that state courts
must provide the same facilities for trials of FELA rights
which local rules require in ordinary negligence cases, no
more or less.
What effect the Dice case84 has on this doctrine in its
operation on the question of what type jury a state must
' Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
80 McKnett v. St.L. & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
241 U.S. 211 (1918).
2 The Court did not pass on the argument that the FELA shows an
intent on the part of Congress to require state courts to follow federal
rules regarding the use of juries. Other cases Indicate that the Court
may be willing to attribute such an intent to Congress: "But the
United States courts have uniformly held that as a matter of general
law the burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defend-
ant . . . Congress in passing the Federal Employers' Liability Act
evidently intended that the Federal statute should be construed in the
light of these and other decisions of the Federal courts." Central Ver-
mont Ry. C. v. White, supra, note 8 at 512. "The right to trial by jury
is 'a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal Jurispru-
dence' . . . It is part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad work-
ers under the Employers' Liability Act . . . To deprive these workers
of the benefits of a jury trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away
a goodly portion of the relief which Congress has afforded them." Bailey
v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943).
83 Frankfurter, dissenting, in Dice v. Akron, supra, note 14.
SSupra, at note 14.
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provide, and when a jury must be provided, is a question
of considerable importance. The minority in the Dice case
suggest that the effect of that opinion is to overrule Bom-
bolis.85 Does this mean that states must provide for juries
similar to those used by the federal courts in state trials
of FELA rights? Such a result would have far-reaching
consequences since twenty-one states now provide for ver-
dicts by other than a unanimous jury.3 6 The Dice majority
opinion is probably not intended to go this far, and even
the minority opinion does not suggest that the case is of
this scope. It seems more plausible to interpret the majority
in Dice to say that where a state does provide a jury as one
of the facilities to be used in local negligence cases (and
thus in FELA trials), the question of when that facility is
to be used in FELA cases is a substantive question to be
decided by federal law. This result is in accordance with
the procedural-substantive line which we have found to be
drawn by the cases. Moreover, this would seem to be a
logical result of the Court's apparent desire in recent years
to maintain federal control over the submission of cases
to the jury.3 7 Mr. Justice Black's language supports this
interpretation of the case:
"It is contended that since a state may consistently
with the Federal Constitution provide for trial of
cases under the Act by a nonunanimous ver-
dict ... Ohio may lawfully eliminate trial byjury as to one phase of fraud while allowing jury
trial as to all other issues raised. The Bombolis
case might be more in point had Ohio abolished
trial by jury in all negligence cases including
those arising under the federal Act. But Ohio has
not done this. It has provided jury trials for
cases arising under the federal Act but seeks to
single out one phase of the question of fraudulent
releases for determination by a judge rather than
by a jury."8
1z Tbid. at 368.
" Bouchelle, Requirement of Consent of Three-Fourths of July to
Verdicts in Civil Actions, Abolishing Law of Unanimous Consent, 48
W.VA.L.Q. 149, 154 (1942).
27 Enlargement of the Jury's Function In FELA Cases, 44 ILL.L.REv.
854 (1950).
-" Supra, note 14 at 363.
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A reconsideration of our conclusions requires that
we again start with the basic dividing line between substan-
tive and procedural questions as used to decide whether
state or federal laws governs a particular question. This
substantive-procedural line has been drawn in the same
place for questions involving federal trial of diversity cases.
The cases show the division of functions between judge and
jury and the right to a jury have both been decided to be
matters of substantive law. From this it would follow that
in diversity cases the federal courts would apply state rules
as to the function of judge and jury. But here, we have
found, the substantive-procedural line gives away to the
Seventh Amendment requirement controlling federal use of
juries. As to federal control, under the FELA, of states'
uses of juries in actions involving rights created by the Act
by use of the substantive-procedural method of deciding
whose law controls, we have decided that the state itself may
decide what facilities it wishes to provide in negligence
actions, and thus for FELA actions. But once a state has
decided the facilities to be provided, federal law will control
the use of those facilities, at least in questions involving the
division of functions between judge and jury.
